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CREDITORS' REMEDIES: DOES THE STATE HELP
THOSE WHO HELP THEMSELVES?
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent constitutional challenges to creditors' statutory self-help reme-
dies and prejudgment procedures' have raised a substantial question
concerning the present parameters of the "state action" doctrine, which
limits the protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment to those in-
dividuals whose rights have been abridged through the activities or conduct
of the state.2 The typical security agreement provides that upon default
the secured party can take possession of the asset or chattel from the
debtor. Depending upon the law of the jurisdiction, the creditor generally
has recourse to one of two statutory methods of repossession: he can act
pursuant to a statute authorizing some form of judicial process or official
involvement, possibly including the assistance of a state officer or agent ;3
or, under a self-help repossession statute, 4 he can recover the collateral on
his own without explicitly invoking the aid of the state itself. Since in
many cases neither type of statute provides for notice or a formal hearing
prior to repossession, the debtor, even if he admits default, may challenge
the validity of the repossession on fourteenth amendment due process
grounds. Whether his constitutional claim is adjudicated, however, de-
pends on the court's finding some measure of state action in the injury
alleged.
1. A comprehensive study of state action and creditor remedies is contained in
Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay
on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003-14; 47 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1-57
(1973). See McCall, The Past as a Prologue: A History of the Right to Repossess,
47 S. CAL. L. REv. 58 (1973). See generally Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Reposses-
sion: An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 82 (1973).
2. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV., § 1.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, which provides a cause of action for persons
whose constitutional rights have been violated, stresses the necessity for state
involvement:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Action which is merely private in nature is not within the prohibition of the
fourteenth amendment nor does the right of action for such private acts fall within
section 1983. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961).
3. See notes 16-47 and accompanying text infra.
4. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503. For a discussion of self-help re-
possession in general, see notes 48-83 and accompanying text infra.
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In a series of opinions beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,5 the Supreme Court of the United States implicitly found state
action present where the statute provided for some form of judicial process
and official assistance. Yet a number of lower courts have recently refused
to find statutory self-help remedies unconstitutional on the ground that,
absent such visible manifestations of state involvement, there was no state
action sufficient to establish a deprivation of constitutional rights. 6 These
decisions have the effect of indirectly sanctioning self-help remedies and
prejudgment procedures without consideration of the constitutional claims.
The scope of this Comment is confined to an evaluation of whether
these lower court holdings with respect to state action are consistent with
the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in this area. More specifically,
the question posed is whether self-help repossession statutes are immune
from fourteenth amendment due process challenges merely because they
fail to provide for judicial process or actual involvement by a state official.
This Comment first discusses four Supreme Court cases - Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.,7 Fuentes v. Shevin,8 Mitchell v. W. T. Grant's
Co.,9 and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.10 - in which
the due process question was adjudicated but in which the state action
question was not explicitly considered. An attempt is made to identify
those elements which could conceivably have given rise to the requisite
finding of state action. It will be submitted that while the most obvious
nexus between the state and the repossession procedure was the authoriza-
tion of judicial process or the assistance of state officials, a close reading
of the cases suggests an alternative ground upon which state action could
have been established - the existence of the statute itself. The focus in
the next section is upon Gibbs v. Titleman,"1 a recent Third Circuit decision
which embodies the typical analysis employed by those courts which
reject all allegations of state action in situations involving self-help legis-
5. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Titleman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Mayhugh v.
Bill Allen Chevrolet Co., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206
(5th Cir. 1974) ; Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
837 (1975) ; Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1973); Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973); Kinch v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 367 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Colvin v. Avco Fin'l Servs., 12
UCC REP. SERV. 25 (D. Utah 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo.
1972); Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v.
First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank of
America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v First Nat'l Bank, 322 F.
Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971) ; Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441,
113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Giglio v. Bank of Delaware, 307 A.2d 816 (Del. Ch. 1973) ;
Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973); Messenger v. Sandy
Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972) ; Brown v. United States Nat'l
Bank, 265 Ore. 234, 509 P.2d 442 (1973) (en banc).
7. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
8. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
9. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
10. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
11. 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974).
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lation. Gibbs is contrasted with the Supreme Court cases presented in
the preceding sections in order to illustrate the dimensions of the state
action controversy.
The Comment then considers three Supreme Court cases, Shelley v.
Kraemer,12 Reitman v. Mulkey, 13 and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,'
14
which explicitly discuss state action principles outside the context of
debtor-creditor relations. It will be submitted, first of all, that these cases
demonstrate that state action can exist even where judicial process and
active official assistance are lacking, and second, that when read in con-
junction with the Sniadach series of decisions, they cast substantial doubt
upon the resolution of the state action question in self-help cases such as
Gibbs. A brief final section summarizes the foregoing analysis and raises
certain questions concerning the future of the state action requirement in
self-help repossession cases.
II. Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, AND North Georgia Finishing:
A STATE ACTION ANALYSIS
Any court considering whether a given creditor's remedy involves
state action must consider the recent Supreme Court decisions dealing
with debtors' due process rights. Although the Court did not explicitly
discuss state action principles in those cases, it is reasonable to assume that
it found state action present, since otherwise the fourteenth amendment
issues could not have been entertained. 15
In a 1969 case, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,16 the Supreme
Court struck down a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute17 on
12. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
13. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
14. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
15. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972) ; Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883).
16. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
17. WIs. STAT. ch. 267 (1965), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.01 et seq.
(Supp. 1975). Pertinent provisions of the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute
are as follows: section 267.02(1) (a) (1) provides one instance when the garnishment
action may be initiated:
(1) A plaintiff may commence a garnishment action at any time after:
(a) A summons is issued: 1. In an action for damages founded upon
upon contract, express or implied ....
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 267.02(1) (a) (1) (Supp. 1975).
The requirements as to the filing of the garnishment action are contained in
sections 267.10(l), (2), which provide:
(1) Before delivery of the garnishee summons and complaint to be served,
a copy of each shall be filed with or mailed to the clerk of the 'court.
(2) Within 10 days following service of the garnishee summons and com-
plaint on the garnishee and notice thereof to the principal defendant, whichever
is later, the plaintiff shall file the original garnishee summons and complaint
with the clerk of the court.
Id. § 267.10(1), (2).
The garnishment action is initiated by requesting the clerk of the court to issue
a garnishee summons. Id. § 267.04(1). The statute states:
(1) Upon payment to the clerk of court of a clerk's fee of $2 and a suit
tax ... , the clerk shall issue a garnishee summons together with sufficient copies
1974--1975] COMMENTS 1037
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the ground that it violated petitioner's right to due process of law.' 8 An
examination of the possible connections of the State of Wisconsin to the
garnishment procedure 19 reveals two bases upon which the Court could
have established the requisite state action. First and most obvious was
the action of the clerk of the court in issuing the garnishee summons 20 -
a clear indication of direct involvement by the state. Yet the Court, in
describing the Wisconsin garnishment procedure, minimized the impact
and importance of the clerk's role:
What happens in Wisconsin is that the clerk of the court issues the
summons at the request of the creditor's lawyer; and it is the latter
who by serving the garnishee sets in motion the machinery whereby
the wages are frozen.2 '
to the plaintiff or his attorney; the summons form may be in blank, but must
carry the court seal.
Id.
The garnishment action is "commenced by the service of a garnishee summons
and annexed verified complaint." Id. § 267.04(3).
The garnishment is accomplished by the plaintiff or his attorney serving the
garnishee summons and complaint on the garnishee and, within 10 days after such
service, notice of the service and the summons in the principal action is to be served
on the principal defendant. Id. § 267.07(1).
The allegations necessary in the garnishee complaint are outlined in section
267.05(1) :
The garnishee complaint in a garnishment action before judgment must allege
the existence of one of the grounds for garnishment mentioned in § 267.02(1) (a),
the amount of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant, above all off sets, known
to the plaintiff, and that plaintiff believes that the named garnishee is indebted
to or has property in his possession or under his control belonging to the de-
fendant (naming him) and that such indebtedness or property is, to the best of
plaintiff's knowledge and belief, not exempt from execution.
Id. § 267.05(1).
Section 267.16(1) provides:
No trial shall be had of the garnishment action until the plaintiff has judgment
in the principal action and if the defendant has judgment the garnishment action
shall be dismissed with costs.
Id. § 267.16(1).
Briefly then, the garnishment procedure before judgment operated in Sniadach
as follows: The plaintiff-creditor or his lawyer requested a garnishee summons from
the clerk of the court. The blank summons was issued automatically upon the pay-
ment of the clerk's fee and a suit tax. The creditor or his lawyer completed the
garnishee summons and also drew the garnishment complaint. A copy of the sum-
mons and the complaint was filed or mailed to the clerk of the court. The garnishee
was then served, and within 10 days, the defendant was served the above along with
a summons in the principal action. Upon service of the garnishee, the wages were
frozen, regardless of whether the defendant had yet received his notice of service.
See 395 U.S. at 338-39.
18. 395 U.S. at 342.
19. The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not discuss the potential problem of state
action. See Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967).
20. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.04(1) (Supp. 1975). For text of this section,
see note 17 supra.
21. 395 U.S. at 338-39 (footnotes omitted). 4
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It would appear, then, that the clerk performed a purely ministerial func-
tion ;22 the issuance of the summons was not discretionary, since the
garnishment procedure could be initiated solely upon payment of clerk's
fees and a suit tax2 3 without any preliminary judicial finding analogous
to the concept of probable cause.24 In short, once the clerk had mechani-
cally issued the blank summons, the operation of the statute was left to
the control of private parties.
25
Since the clerk performed a mere perfunctory and passive role in
initiating the garnishment procedure, it is arguable that the authorizing
statute itself was of primary importance with respect to state action. 'To
be sure, several factors militate against concluding that the presence of
the statute alone was sufficient for the purposes of state action. For
example, the garnishment procedure authorized by the Wisconsin statute
22. It should be explained that the defendant in Sniadach argued as one ground
of relief in the state court that there had been an assumption of judicial powers by the
clerk of the court in violation of article 7, section 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
37 Wis. 2d at 174-77, 154 N.W.2d at 266. The Wisconsin Supreme Court apparently
sanctioned an extension of the power of the clerk beyond that which existed according
to the terms of the statute. See note 17 supra. Merely at the request of the creditor
and the payment of fees, a blank summons would be issued to the creditor by the clerk.
The completed summons and the garnishee complaint would be filed with the clerk
prior to service on the garnishee and the defendant. Significantly, the statute provided
that failure to comply with the filing requirements would require that the garnishment
action be dismissed. See id. Thus, although the Wisconsin Supreme Court assumed
that a clerk may dismiss the action for failure to comply with section 267.10 of the
Wisconsin statute or with the requisites of the garnishee complaint contained in
section 267.05(1), such power is not expressly authorized to the clerk by the statute.
And, as a practical matter, the garnishment may have already gone into effect prior
to the dismissal. The majority opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court apparently
viewed the conduct of the clerk as ministerial. See 37 Wis. 2d at 176-77, 154 N.W.2d
at 266. The dissenting opinion agreed with the majority on this point, stating:
I agree with the court's rationale that the only determination required of the clerk
is a ministerial one, that is, it is only necessary for the plaintiff to set forth in the
language of the statute the basis upon which the summons is requested. This is
not a determination of probable cause. It is not a judicial function and is not
constitutionally prohibited [by the Wisconsin Constitution].
Id. at 185, 154 N.W.2d at 271 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
It is submitted that the activation of the garnishment procedure required no
affirmative action whatsoever once the blank summons was issued. The wages could
have been frozen regardless of the possibility of dismissal imposed by section 267.10 (3).
23. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.04(1) (Supp. 1975). For text of this section, see
note 17 supra.
24. The presence of a judicial determination was a crucial factor in Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant's Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See text accompanying note 41 infra.
25. Arguably, the form of the garnishee summons created substantial state action,
not by the act of any state official, but by indirect means. The form of the summms
provided for a caption entitled, "State of Wisconsin -----------...... Court -----.---...........
County." The notice provision in the form began, "The State of Wisconsin, to Said
Garnishee." See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.04(2) (Supp. 1975). The form also contains
the seal of the court. Id. The use of such a form would create the appearance of
affixing the state's imprimatur to the procedure.
Although it may be that this form could be annexed to the conduct of the clerk
of the court, thereby causing his ministerial act to become greater direct state involve-
ment, it would appear that this form is, in substance, only a part of the statutory
procedure and has no relationship with the involvement of the clerk which retains its
de minimis character. 5
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was permissive; it did not compel the creditor's use of the garnishment
machinery 26 but merely made it available. Since it allowed a private
decision as to whether it would be employed, it in no way forced upon the
creditor a state-prescribed remedy. But significantly, the Wisconsin
statute arose in derogation of the common law of the state,27 creating a
right in the creditor unknown prior to its enactment. Thus, it can be
inferred that the state, in enacting such a remedy, had indeed thrust itself
into the debtor-creditor arena.
The second creditor-remedy case was Fuentes v. Shevin,28 decided
in 1972. In Fuentes, the Supreme Court held Florida and Pennsylvania
replevin statutes29 unconstitutional in that they denied procedural due
process.30 Fuentes involved a creditor remedy which, in two obvious
aspects, represented some connection with the state. First, there were
the actions of the clerk of the court in Florida and the prothonotary of the
26. See id. § 267.02(1)(a)(1). For the text of this section, see note 17 supra.
27. Skalecki v. Frederick, 31 Wis. 2d 496, 143 N.W.2d 520 (1966); Markman v.
Becker, 6 Wis. 2d 438, 95 N.W.2d 233 (1959) ; Mahrle v. Engle, 261 Wis. 485, 53
N.W.2d 176 (1952) ; State v. Pauli, 126 Wis. 65, 104 N.W. 1007 (1905).
28. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Decided together with Fuentes was Parham v. Cortese
on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania. Id. For the District Court opinions in these cases, see Parham v Cortese, 326
F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ; Fuentes v. Shevin, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
29. Section 78.01 of the Florida Replevin statute provided:
Any person whose goods or chattels are wrongfully detained by any other person
or officer may have a writ of replevin to recover them and any damages sustained
by reason of the wrongful caption or detention as herein provided ....
Law of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 28, [1967] Fla. Laws 660, as amended, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 78.01 (Supp. 1975).
Section 78.07 provided:
Before a replevy writ issues, plaintiff shall file a bond with surety payable to
defendant to be approved by the clerk in at least double the value of the property
to be replevied conditioned that plaintiff will prosecute his action to effect and
without delay and that if defendant recovers judgment against him in the action,
he will return the property, if return thereof is adjudged, and will pay defendant
all sums of money recovered against plaintiff by defendant in the action.
Law of June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 28, [1967] Fla. Laws 662 (repealed 1973).
The Pennsylvania statute provided authorization for writs of replevin:
It shall and may be lawful for the justices of each county in this province to
grant writs of replevin, in all cases whatsoever, where replevins may be granted
by the laws of England, taking security as the said law directs, and make them
returnable to the respective courts of common pleas, in the proper county, there
to be determined according to law.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1821 (1967).
30. A significant aspect of Fuentes was that it clearly established that Sniadach
was not limited to situations where the property taken was considered to be necessary
to the debtor. 407 U.S. at 89. The Court discussed the issue in the following manner:
No doubt, there may be many gradations in the "importance" or "necessity"
of various consumer goods. Stoves could be compared to television sets, or beds
could be compared to tables. But if the root principle of procedural due process is
to be applied with objectivity, it cannot rest on such distinctions. It is not the
business of a court adjudicating due process rights to make its own critical evalua-
tion of [consumer] choices and protect only the ones that, by its own lights, are
"necessary."
Id. at 89-90 (footnote omitted). 6
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court in Pennsylvania in issuing the writs of replevin.31 Second, state
officials executed the writs in both states, 2 a factor absent in Sniadach. a
While it would appear that the two-pronged involvement of the
state - the action of the clerk plus the seizure by state officials - would
alone support a finding of state action, 4 the Court, as in Sniadach, empha-
sized the real lack of knowing and active state participation in the replevin
procedure:
The statutes, moreover, abdicate effective state control over state
power. Private parties, serving their own private advantage, may
unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods from another. No
state official participates in the decision to seek a writ; no state official
reviews the basis for the claim to repossession; and no state official
evaluates the need for immediate seizure. There is not even a require-
ment that the plaintiff provide any information to the court on these
matters. The State acts largely in the dark.8 5
This language supports the proposition that here, as in Sniadach, the
actual involvement of state officials was not the only possible basis of
31. See note 29 supra. In Pennsylvania the procedure by which the replevin was to
be obtained was described in Rule 1073 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) An action of replevin with bond shall be commenced by filing with the
prothonotary a praecipe for a writ of replevin with bond, together with
(1) the plaintiff's affidavit of the value of the property to be replevied,
and
(2) the plaintiff's bond in double the value of the property, with
security approved by the prothonotary, naming the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania as obligee, conditioned that if plaintiff fails to
maintain his right of possession of the property, he shall pay to the
party entitled thereto the value of the property and all legal costs,
fees and damages sustained by reason of the issuance of the writ.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1073.
32. The Florida statute provided:
The writ shall command the officer to whom it may be directed to replevy
the goods and chattels in possession of defendant, describing them, and to summon
the defendant to answer the complaint.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 78.08 (Supp. 1975).
Rule 1077(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Property taken into possession by the sheriff shall be held by him until the
expiration of the time for filing a counterbond. If the property is not ordered
to be impounded and if no counterbond is filed, the sheriff shall deliver the property
to the plaintiff.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1077(b).
33. See note 17 supra.
34. The Court narrowed the issue in the following manner:
The issue is whether procedural due process in the context of these cases requires
an opportunity for a hearing before the state authorizes its agents to seize property
in the possession of a person upon the application of another.
407 U.S. at 80 (emphasis added). In discussing the constitutional right to procedural
due process, the Court stated:
[The] purpose [of the constitutional right to be heard] . . . is to protect [the
individual's] use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment - to
minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that
is especially great when the State seizes goods simply upon the application of and
for the benefit of a private party.
Id. at 81.
35. Id. at 93 (footnote omitted). 7
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state action. First, since the role of the state was deemphasized, the statute
itself emerges as a possible connection between the state and the debtor.
Second, the Court's implication that the state, having enacted legislation to
establish a creditor remedy procedure, had a concurrent duty to conform
the procedure to constitutional standards,36 emphasized the importance of
the state's enactment of procedures which make certain remedies available
to private parties.
Of the recent debtor-creditor cases decided by the Supreme Court,
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant's Co. 3 7 presented perhaps the clearest case of
active judicial process and official involvement. In Mitchell, the plaintiffs
unsuccessfully attacked Louisiana's sequestration procedures , on fourteenth
amendment due process grounds.3 9 Here, as in Fuentes, the writ was
executed by a sheriff,40 but unlike either Sniadach or Fuentes, the writ of
sequestration was issued by a judge upon a "clear showing" of cause
rather than by a clerk of the court.41 Nevertheless, the importance of the
statute itself as a basis for state action should not be minimized. The
Court's discussion, for instance, revealed an awareness of the state's role
as an active shaper and creator of rights made available to private parties
through the authorizing statute.4 2 Even more significantly, the Louisiana
statute provided that in all areas outside Orleans Parish, the situs of
Mitchell, only the clerk of the court, not a judge, could issue the writ of
sequestration. 43 In light of Sniadach and Fuentes, it is reasonable to
assume that in a great many cases arising under the statute, the state's
involvement would be characterized as passive rather than active, the
clerk's ministerial role replacing the discretion of the judge, and that con-
sequently the legislation itself would emerge as an alternative basis of state
action.
36. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
37. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
38. The applicable Louisiana statute provided:
When one claims the ownership or right to possession of property, or a mort-
gage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the property seized under a writ of
sequestration, if it is within the power of the defendant to conceal, dispose of, or
waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the property from the
parish, during the pendency of the action.
LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).
39. In an opinion by Mr. Justice White, who dissented in Fuentes, 407 U.S. at
97, the Court held that the statutory sequestration procedure complied with procedural
due process, in that it "effects a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting in-
terests of the parties." 416 U.S. at 607.
40. See LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 3504 (West 1961).
41. Id. art. 281-86 (West 1960).
42. For example, in discussing the potential depreciation in the value of the goods
while in the buyer's possession, the court noted that "[tihe State of Louisiana was
entitled to recognize this reality and to provide somewhat more protection for the
seller." 416 U.S. at 608.
43. Id. at 606. See LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 281-83 (West 1960).
1042 [VOL. 20
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COMMENTS
Finally, in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,44 the most
recent Supreme Court case in this area, the Court declared a Georgia
statute,45 entitling plaintiffs in pending suits to the process of garnishment.
invalid for failure to provide adequate notice and hearing in connection
with the issuance of the writ.48  Here a corporate bank account was im-
pounded by a writ of garnishment issued by a court clerk and without
participation by a judicial officer. Although the action of the court clerk
would appear indicative of active state participation in the garnishment
process, the Court minimized its importance by contrasting the clerk's
purely perfunctory role with the more meaningful judicial determination
in Mitchell.47 Once again, it would seem that the mere presence of the
garnishment statute, investing certain rights to private parties, cannot be
disregarded as a source of state action.
To summarize, in Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia
Finishing the issue of state action never reached the surface of the Supreme
Court's discussion, yet its decision to adjudicate plaintiffs' constitutional
claims reveals that the Court must have found the requisite state action
present. Considered as a whole, the four cases demonstrate that the state
action requirement is clearly fulfilled where the statute authorizes some
form of judicial process or actual involvement by a state official. Further-
more, an analysis of the Court's reasoning suggests an alternative ground
sufficient to support a finding of state action - the existence of state
legislation itself.
III. Gibbs v. Titleman - No STATE ACTION
In light of the state action principles implied by the Sniadach series
of decisions, it is useful at this point to contrast a typical lower court
self-help repossession case in which state action was found lacking. Gibbs
v. Titleman4s involved a due process attack on certain provisions of the
44. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). As noted by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion,
North Georgia Finishing marked the continuing vitality of Fuentes, the demise of
which had been reported in Mitchell. Id. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. The relevant portions of the Georgia statute are as follows:
In cases where suit shall be pending, or where judgment shall have been
obtained, the plaintiff shall be entitled to the process of garnishment under the
following regulations: Provided, however, no garnishment shall issue against
the . . wages of any person residing in this State. . . . Provided, further, that
nothing in this section shall be construed as abridging the right of garnishment in
attachment before judgment is obtained.
GA. Cona ANN. § 46-101 (1974).
46. Section 46-102 of the garnishment statute provides:
The plaintiff, his agent, or attorney at law shall make affidavit before some
officer authorized to issue an attachment, or the clerk of any court of record in
which the said garnishment is being filed or in which the main case is filed, stating
the amount claimed to be due ....
Id. § 46-102.
47. 419 U.S. at 607.
48. 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974).
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Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act (Motor Vehicle Act) 49
and the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code. 50 Each of the plaintiffs
financed the purchase of an automobile either through an installment sale
contract or a loan agreement which required periodic payments over a
specified period of time. As collateral security for the indebtedness, each
created a security interest in his automobile. The agreements provided
that in event of default the creditor would have the right to retake the
automobile with or without judicial process.5 ' The substance of the con-
tractual provisions conformed to the standards set by the two Pennsylvania
statutes, which in essence provided that, if the creditor chose not to
initiate formal court proceedings, he could, upon default, immediately
seize the debtor's property, so long as the repossession was effectuated in
a lawful manner.52
The plaintiffs contended that the state statutes were unconstitutional
insofar as they permitted creditors, upon default by the debtor, to repossess
automobiles peaceably without resort to judicial process. On these facts
the district court found that there was sufficient state involvement to con-
stitute state action 53 and held that lack of prior notice and an opportunity to
be heard rendered the extrajudicial repossession unconstitutional. 4 On
appeal, however, the Third Circuit found that no state action was present,
thus precluding a reconsideration of the due process question on the
merits.15 Before discussing the Third Circuit opinion, a brief review of
the lower court opinion is necessary.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 623-27 (1965). Section 623(A) provides for
repossession by self-help:
When the buyer shall be in default in the payment of any amount due under
a motor vehicle installment sale contract or when the buyer has committed any
other breach of contract, which is by the contract specifically made a ground for
retaking the motor vehicle, the seller or any holder, who has lawfully acquired
such contract, may retake possession thereof. Unless the motor vehicle can be
retaken without breach of the peace, it shall be retaken by legal process, but
nothing herein shall be construed to authorize a violation of the criminal law.
Id. § 623(A) (emphasis added).
50. The plaintiff attacked the repossession and disposition of collateral provisions
of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 9-503,
-504 (1970). Section 9-503(1) provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may
require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured
party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably con-
venient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment
unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under sec-
tion 9-504.
Id. § 9-503(1) (emphasis added).
51. 502 F.2d at 1109.
52. See notes 46 & 47 supra.
53. Gibbs v. Titleman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 44-50 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
54. Id. at 54-59.
55. 502 F.2d at 1110.
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A. The District Court Opinion
The district court defined the state action issue as requiring a determi-
nation of whether repossession by the defendants, who were private persons,
was performed "under color of any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage."'56 Noting the division of authority on this issue,57 the
court summarized and commented upon the principal bases which courts
have utilized to support a finding of no state action.
The court first considered the proposition that self-help procedures
have a "well-established heritage in the common law, which has precedential
value that exists notwithstanding the remedy's statutory codification."55
In other words, since self-help actions were founded at common law59
long before they were codified, the mere existence of a repossession statute
would not constitute state action.60 The district court, however, found
self-help repossession to be an historically unsound remedy. In the opinion
of the court, the alleged precedential value of self-help actions was nil,
for while they may have fulfilled a valid need in past ages, their importance
was minimal due to the fact that modern, sophisticated judicial systems
are entirely capable of redressing those injuries which result from the
debtor-creditor relationship. 61 It would appear, then, that by enacting
self-help legislation, the state had preserved a remedy which historically
was bound for extinction.
The second basis upon which courts have held state action to be
lacking in self-help repossession cases is the passive nature of the state's
involvement.6 2 Such passive involvement is present "where a statute merely
56. 369 F. Supp. at 44, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). The plaintiffs had
invoked jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and (4) (1970) because these
sections provided federal courts with jurisdiction over claims brought under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, id. § 1983.
57. See cases cited in 369 F. Supp. at 45.
58. 369 F. Supp. at 45, citing, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492
F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1975).
59. Self-help remedies were known at common law as distress or distraint. 369
F. Supp. at 45-46.
60. In Fuentes, counsel for Florida argued that since the constitutionality of the
replevin procedure had been recognized even when it was contained only in the com-
mon law, it was not now subject to attack. 32 L. Ed. 2d 929. This argument, it is
submitted, failed to heed the differences between the replevin statutes and their
common law counterparts. One important distinction, which the Fuentes Court itself
noted, was that the statutes provided for an ex parte proceeding, whereas the common
law did not. 407 U.S. at 78.
61. 369 F. Supp. at 47. The court quoted Professor Street discussing self-help,
in stating:
If a system of law fully adapted to the capacity and purpose of man could come
into existence without regard to antecedent conditions, distress would certainly
have no place in it. Legal evolution tends to bring all procedure into the category
of legal process, and thus to eliminate self-help altogether.
Id. at 46, quoting 3 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 285 (1906).
62. 369 F. Supp. at 47. As examples of cases decided on this basis, the district
court cited Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973) ;
Greene v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Kirksey v.
Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972).
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allows for a certain act of a private individual to occur, ' 63 whereas active
involvement manifests itself where a statute "compels an event" or where
there is direct action by a state official. 64 The district court rejected this
distinction,65 declaring that since self-help statutes give the creditor an
advantage over the debtor, they clothe the creditor with a "power which
can only truly be consistent with the state."0 6 In viewing the issue in this
manner, the court relied heavily upon language in Fuentes which directed
itself to state power,6 7 and which the district court construed as "not the
power to have a deputy sheriff or constable act as your collection agency,
[but rather] the power to decide your rights are greater than another's."6 8
Simply by permitting self-help repossession, concluded the court, the state
extended to the creditor a license to perform a state function, and as such,
his actions were reviewable under the fourteenth amendment.6 9
B. The Court of Appeals Decision
In resolving the state action question on appeal, the Third Circuit
summarily distinguished Gibbs from Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell,
stating that, unlike those Supreme Court cases in which state action was
clearly present, the seizures complained of in Gibbs "were effected by
private individuals without the aid of any state official." °7 0 Finding no
direct state involvement in either of the Pennsylvania statutes in question,
71
the court addressed itself to two claims upon which plaintiffs had based
their claim of state action:
63. 369 F. Supp. at 47.
64. Id.
65. 369 F. Supp. at 48. In rejecting the active-passive distinction, the district
court stated: "This power has no less an impact on the person whose goods are taken
when the state does not compel the power be used." Id. As a result of this rejection,
the court refrained from deciding whether the existence of the Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act constituted direct or passive state action. Id. at 47-48 n.17.
66. Id. at 48.
67. 407 U.S. at 93. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
68. It is arguable that the district court misinterpreted the term because the
power referred to in Fuentes was not the power to decide rights, but rather the power
or ability of the state to control the operation of its own legal processes. Nevertheless,
the idea expressed in the district court's interpretation is of some import. While the
repossessor may not be "clothed" in the sense that he acts qua state official, he does
act with the support of state law. In other words, he is clothed with a statutory
justification for his acts committed as an individual.
69. 369 F. Supp. at 48.
70. 502 F.2d at 1110. See also Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1974),
where the Second Circuit responded similarly. This summary distinction, especially
in light of the minor action of the clerk in Sniadach, denotes a judicial disposition to
immediately escape the broad range of Sniadach and Fuentes. It is difficult to under-
stand why a court cannot analyze the virtually non-existent action by a state official
in Sniadach and conclude that, but for the statutory procedure, there was no direct
state official involvement. Compare the wage assignment statute in Bond, 494 F.2d
308, with the garnishment statute in Sniadach. See note 17 supra. By omitting the
act of any state official, New York had accomplished a procedure virtually identical
to that struck down in Sniadach.
71. 502 F.2d at 1110. 12
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1) By comprehensively regulating the field of automobile financing,
without prohibiting the practice of self-help repossession, the State
of Pennsylvania has become so involved and has so encouraged this
private remedy that it becomes "state action," or
2) by allowing the practice of self-help repossession, the State of
Pennsylvania has abdicated or delegated to private individuals a
traditional state function, thus infusing the private act of reposses-
sion with "state action.
'72
The court rejected plaintiffs' first contention on numerous grounds.
First, because self-help repossession statutes had been permitted at common
law prior to the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Act, the codification of
the remedy failed to change the long-established rights of the creditor. 73
Similarly, the court insisted with little comment that private repossessions
were not infused with state action merely because the state chose to enact
section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which codified the common
law self-help remedy as positive law.
74
Second, the court characterized the Motor Vehicle Act as neutral on
its face, since it neither "compelled nor prohibited" the contested seizures.75
Under the Act, self-help repossession was a private remedy enforced by
private conduct pursuant to a privately negotiated agreement. The impetus
for the alleged constitutional violation being private, there was no significant
state involvement.7 " Indeed, the court stressed that to hold that every at-
tempt on the part of the state to regulate comprehensively an area of private
conduct gives rise to state action would virtually obliterate the distinction
between state and private action. 77 Finally, the court noted that the
intent of the provision was not to encourage the creditor's conduct but
rather to "curb the abuses associated with private repossession" by limit-
ing the situations where such a remedy was possible. 78 In the opinion of
the Third Circuit, then, whatever encouragement emanated from the statutes
was only "indirect and highly conjectural.
'79
In rejecting the plaintiffs' second contention - that state action existed
in the delegation to private individuals of a function traditionally performed
by the state - the circuit court stressed that, since the common law had
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1111.
74. Id. at 1113, citing Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet Co., 496 F.2d 16 (8th
Cir. 1974), James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), Shirley v. State Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974), and Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank,
492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
75. Id. at 1110 (footnotes omitted). Section 23 of the Motor Vehicle Sales
Finance Act provides that the "seller . . .may retake possession . . . ." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 69, § 623(A) (1965). Section 9-503 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Com-
mercial Code states that "a secured party has ... the right to take possession ... 
Id. tit. 12A, § 9-503(1) (1970).
76. 502 F.2d at 1110.
77. Id. at 1112.
78. Id. at 1111-12.
79. Id. at 1111.
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recognized repossession as a private remedy, it never had been a traditional
function of the state.80 In line with this view the court narrowly interpreted
"state action," as used in Fuentes,8' to mean action by "state officers
to accomplish the seizures for the creditor,"8 2 thus explicitly rejecting the
more expansive reading of the district court. 83 In the opinion of the Third
Circuit, then, Pennsylvania had not delegated a traditional state function
to the creditor in codifying the self-help remedies.
Thus, while the district court in Gibbs found in self-help repossession
statutes a repository of state involvement, the court of appeals found such
statutes wholly devoid of any element which would support a finding of
state action. Significantly, both courts found the Sniadach line of cases
germane to their respective, albeit contrary, purposes. The substance of
the lower court opinion would appear to buttress the view that, even in
the absence of judicial process or actual state involvement, the mere
existence of the statute is a sufficient manifestation of state action. Con-
trariwise, the court of appeals took the view that it is precisely the more
visible and obvious incidents of state involvement which are essential to
give rise to a finding of state action.
IV. A RESOLUTION OF THE STATE ACTION ISSUE
Given the distinction between self-help statutes and those provisions
which authorize some measure of actual state involvement, it would seem
that the Gibbs court was on solid ground in summarily distinguishing
Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell from the facts before it. It is submitted,
however, that three Supreme Court cases dealing explicitly with the state
action question in contexts other than that of debtor-creditor rights, Shelley
v. Kraemer,84 Reitman v. Mulkey,8 5 and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis"6
together support the proposition that some form of judicial process or
actual involvement by a state official is not essential for a finding of state
action. Consequently, these cases shed light upon the potential dimensions
of state action in the Sniadach series of decisions and cast serious doubt
upon the Third Circuit's disposition of the state action question in Gibbs.
80. Id. at 1114.
81. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
82. 502 F.2d at 1114. The court focused on language in a footnote in Fuentes
which seemingly supported this holding: "[A]t common law a creditor could 'invoke
state power' through the action of debt or detinue or alternatively a 'creditor could ...
proceed without the use of state power, through self-help, by "distraining" the property
before a judgment.'" Id., quoting 407 U.S. at 79 n.12 (emphasis added by the
Gibbs Court). In addition, the dissent of Mr. Justice White, 407 U.S. at 12, was
read as clearly distinguishing between state action and purely private action such as
repossession. 502 F.2d at 1114.
83. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
84. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
85. 387 U.S. 369 (1969).
86. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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A. Shelley, Reitman, and Irvis
Petitioners in Shelley v. Kraemer 7 were blacks who had purchased
houses from white owners notwithstanding the fact that the properties
were subject to racially restrictive covenants. In an action brought by
other landowners whose properties were also subject to the agreement, the
state court enforced the covenant and divested the petitioners of title.88
The Supreme Court held that even though the state had not created the
property restrictions by statute or local ordinance, and even though the
discrimination was in the first instance pursuant to a private agreement,
the state's enforcement of the covenants brought the case within the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.a9
In reviewing the state action principles to be applied, the Court
emphasized that the action of state courts and judicial officers in their
official capacities, including the action of state courts in enforcing substantive
common law rules,90 was state action for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment.9' Yet the Court appeared to broaden this definition by suggesting
that state action included "exertions of state power in all forms," 92 and
that "state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive
proceedings" was void if violative of the fourteenth amendment. 93 The
Court expressly characterized the state's common law as state law.
94
The question of whether, as Shelley intimated, state codification of a
common law right, as opposed to the state's enforcement of that right, was
87. 334 U.S.1 (1948).
88. Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1946).
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id. at 17. The cases cited by the Shelley Court for this proposition all in-
volved situations where the common law was unconstitutional as applied. See, e.g.,
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (conviction for common law contempt
violative of constitutional rights of freedoms of speech and of press) ; American Fed'n
of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (common law policy limiting peaceful
picketing by labor unions abridges constitutional right of freedom of discussion);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (conviction for common law breach of
the peace violative of constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of religion).
Nonetheless, it would be difficult to strike down an argument that common law may
be unconstitutional in substance. See 334 U.S. at 19 & n.22.
91. 334 U.S. at 14.
92. Id. at 20.
93. 334 U.S. at 14, quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883). In
a footnote, the Shelley Court summarized the different descriptions of state action
contained in the Civil Rights Cases:
"[The operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or
judicial"; "State laws and State proceedings"; "State law ... or some State
action through its officers or agents"; "State laws and acts done under State
authority"; "State laws, or State action of some kind"; "such laws as the States
may adopt or enforce"; "such acts and proceedings as the States may commit or
take"; "State legislation or action"; "State law or State authority."
334 U.S. at 15 n.13, quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 13-15, 17 (1883)
(emphasis added).
94. See 334 U.S. at 17 n.19 where the Shelley Court specifically refers to Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), stating: "it is clear that the common-law
rules enunciated by state courts in judicial opinions are to be regarded as a part of
the law of the State."
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an exertion of "state power" and thus state action was considered in a
different light by the Court in Reitman v. Mulkey.95 Reitman involved an
equal protection attack upon section 26 of article one of the California
constitution,96 which prohibited the state from limiting the ability of any
person to transfer real property as he or she may desire. Plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants had refused to rent them an apartment solely because
of their race.97 Although no state officials were involved, the Court affirmed
the California Supreme Court ruling98 that the enactment of the section
connected the state to the private discrimination since it effectively en-
couraged the defendant's conduct.99
The California Supreme Court had found that the immediate design
and intent of section 26 was to nullify existing state laws concerned with
the right of private persons to discriminate in transactions involving the
transfer of real property. 10 0 Thus, section 26 established "a purported
constitutional right to privately discriminate on grounds which admittedly
would be unavailable under the Fourteenth Amendment should state action
be involved."''1 1
The second part of the California decision had sought to determine
whether there was the necessary "significant state involvement. ' 10 2  In
deciding this issue in the affirmative, the California court had analyzed
prior Supreme Court decisions 10 and found that state action could exist
even if there were only encouragement of the private conduct and not
compulsion. According to the California Supreme Court, the legislative
action "authorized private discrimination.' 0 4  Therefore, the California
95. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
96. The provision states in pertinent part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to
sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent
such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26. The provision was submitted to the California electorate as
proposition 14 in a statewide ballot in 1964. 387 U.S. at 370-71.
97. 387 U.S. at 372.
98. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
99. 387 U.S. at 378-79.
100. 64 Cal. 2d at 534, 413 P.2d at 829, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
101. Id. at 536, 1413 P.2d at 830, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
102. Id. at 540, 413 P.2d at 832, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 888. The test laid down by the
Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), was
whether to "some significant extent the state in any of its manifestations has been
found to have become involved in [the private conduct]." Id. at 722. The California
court had to determine the involvement of the state was significant since it had con-
ceded that a state was permitted a neutral position and that there was no requirement
under the fourteenth amendment that a state was bound to forbid private discrimina-
tion. 64 Cal. 2d at 540, 413 P.2d at 832, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 888. It is interesting to note
that in the Supreme Court decision Justice Harlan believed that there was "no ques-
tion" as to the presence of state action, seemingly on the basis of the existence of
section 26 itself. 387 U.S. at 392 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
103. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156 (1964) ; Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S.
399 (1964); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254. (1953) ; McCabe v. Atchison,
Top. & Santa F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
104. 64 Cal. 2d at 542, 413 P.2d at 837, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
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court concluded that the state had become unconstitutionally involved and
that consequently, section 26 was violative of the fourteenth amendment, 1°5
In upholding the state court decision, the Supreme Court described
the rationale underlying the encouragement theory in the following manner:
The right to discriminate, including the right to discriminate on racial
grounds, was now embodied in the State's basic charter, immune
from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of state
government. Those practicing racial discriminations need no longer
solely rely on their personal choice. They could now invoke express
constitutional authority, free from censure or interference of any kind
from official sources.
10 6
The principle espoused in Reitman, then, was that because of some form
of state authority, private persons who would normally act on the basis
of personal beliefs could now point to external justification for their con-
duct in the form of expressly manifested authority.
The limitations of the "encouragement" theory were considered by
the Supreme Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.1°7 In that case,
plaintiff, a black guest at Moose Lodge, asserted that there had been a
violation of his equal protection rights as a result of defendant's refusal
to serve him alcoholic beverages. State action was allegedly founded on
the licensing by the Pennsylvania State Liquor Control Board of private
organizations such as Moose Lodge for the dispensing of alcoholic bever-
ages.'0 8 The Court, with four members dissenting, held state actioh
lacking on the facts of this case.
Initially, the Irvis Court noted that the "impetus for the forbidden
discrimination need not originate with the State if it is state action that
enforces privately originated discrimination."' 1 9 Yet the court stressed
that not every form of state involvement - such as the regulations at
issue or state benefits and services - would constitute state action for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment." 0 Where there existed a private
105. Id. at 543, 413 P.2d at 837, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
106. 387 U.S. at 377. This language need not be limited to state constitutional
provisions. This "authority" can include state statutes as well as state constitutions,
since such statutes offer external justification to private parties to make certain
decisions regarding their course of conduct. See, e.g., Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 197 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), where
justice Brennan apparently viewed the Reitman rationale as applicable to both con-
stitutional and legislative enactments.
107. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
108. Id. at 165.
109. Id. at 172. It should be noted that this language focuses upon the impetus for
the private conduct, stating that it does not necessarily have to arise from the state.
However, in the self-help cases, such impetus may in fact be created by the existence of
the statutory provisions and therefore not "purely private." See id. at 173. A creditor,
with knowledge of and on the authority of the self-help legislation, may in fact initiate
self-help procedures. It is submitted that without such legislation, this self-help con-
duct may not have occurred.
110. Id. at 173. It may be significant that, as examples of benefits and services,
the Irvis Court listed electricity, water, and police and fire protection, that is, neces-
sities of life. It should be noted that such services are also given to religious institu-
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impetus for the conduct, the state must be "'significantly involved ... with
the invidious discrimination.' " The Court found that with one ex-
ception, the regulations of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board played
absolutely no part in establishing or enforcing the discriminatory member-
ship policies of Moose Lodge. 112
The one exception which gave rise to state action grew out of the
Board's promulgation of a regulation requiring the private organizations
which had received licenses to comply strictly with their own constitutions
and by-laws. 113 Since the constitution and by-laws of Moose Lodge con-
tained provisions and policies which were discriminatory with respect to
membership and guest requirements n1 4 the regulation in effect required
Moose Lodge to enforce discriminatory policies, thereby giving state
approval to them. Consequently, the Court enjoined the application of
the regulation as violating the equal protection clause. 115
Thus, in Shelley, Reitman, and Irvis, the Supreme Court found state
action present even in the absence of official involvement or judicial process.
In Reitman the Court approved the proposition implied in Shelley that
the existence of state law could itself be state action due to its influence
upon the decisionmaking processes of private persons. While Irvis might
be described as imposing a qualitative limitation upon the encouragement
doctrine, it is submitted that the two cases are generally consistent. Taken
together, Reitman and Irvis suggest that where state law gives no impetus
to private conduct, there must be significant state involvement, but where
the state law encourages the private conduct, even incidentally, the law
itself will support a finding of state action.
B. Shelley, Reitman, and Irvis Applied to Gibbs
It is submited that Shelley, Reitman, and Irvis should be determina-
tive of the state action issue in self-help cases such as Gibbs, both as direct
precedent and for the support they provide for the state action principles
implied in Sniadach and its successors. Shelley stands for the proposition
tions and groups even though the first amendment precludes government involvement
with such entities. It is submitted that these examples can be said to be minimal
benefits and would not necessitate a finding of state action since every individual or
private entity is permitted the same benefits and services. As the Court indicated,
such a connection with the state to qualify as state action would "emasculate" the
state action limitation. Id. But in the context of self-help, the state acts officially with
respect to only a limited class. In such a case, the state involvement is not the same
with respect to each and every private individual or entity. Accordingly, such "emascu-
lation" as the Court envisioned would not necessarily occur.
111. Id., quotin.q Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967).
112. 407 U.S. at 175-76.
113. Section 113.09 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board Regulations pro-
vided: "Every club licensee shall adhere to all of the provisions of its constitution and
By-Laws." 40 PA. ConE § 581 (1952).
114. See 407 U.S. at 178.
115. Specifically, the Court enjoined enforcement of the regulation insofar as it
necessitated compliance by the Lodge with its discriminatory membership and guest
policies contained in the Lodge constitution and by-laws. Id. at 179.
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that state law, including common law, whether it creates a right or merely
enforces a previously existing right, must conform to the requirements of
the fourteenth amendment." 6 It is thus arguable that any state law
qualifies as state action per se.1 1 7 Consequently, the Gibbs conclusion that
it is the statutory provision for judicial process or the participation of state
officials that alone gives rise to state action is difficult to justify.
Shelley is also significant with respect to the reasoning of a number of
lower courts that the common law existence of the right to self-help
repossession negates state action even if the law is subsequently codified.",8
Shelley held that the common law of a state is to be considered as state
law ;119 thus, whether codification of the common law exists or not, there
is state action. 2° Due to the common law origins of self-help repossession,
it would seem that Gibbs necessarily involved state action.
Reitman also should control the state action question involved in Gibbs.
Underlying Reitman, which involved a neutral constitutional provision not
expressly or directly encouraging private discrimination,'12 1 was the rationale
that through such legislation the state provided an external justification
for private conduct.122 The self-help cases, by contrast, involve legislation
which is not in any sense neutral but expressly authorizes private conduct
which deprives the debtor of property without notice or hearing. It is
submitted that this is a more compelling factual situation than that which
existed in Reitman: if encouragement can be found where the legislation
prescribes no particular activity whatsoever, then certainly it is present
where statutory authority exists for the precise course of conduct under-
taken by the creditor. Hence, Reitman should control outright the theory
of state action set forth in the self-help cases.
In much the same sense, self-help statutes differ noticeably from the
liquor control provisions upheld in Irvis. In Irvis the Court appeared to
limit the applicability of the "encouragement" theory to those situations
in which the state statute bore some demonstrable relation to the contested
private conduct. 23 While it is at least arguable that the regulatory scheme
in Irvis had only a tenuous connection with the private discrimination of
Moose Lodge, self-help provisions do influence the conduct of the creditor
and the rights arising from his or her relationship with the debtor. Indeed,
it is important to remember that to the extent that the Irvis statute af-
116. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra.
117. Id.
118. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
120. Prior to the landmark case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
wherein the Supreme Court held that a federal court sitting in a diversity case was
bound to apply the common law of the state, there may have been some question
as to whether "state law" for purposes of the Civil Rights Act was to be con-
strued as it was defined in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) as applying only to the
positive law of a state, i.e., legislation.
121. See note 96 supra.
122. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
123. See notes 110 & 111 and accompanying text supra.
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fected the Moose Lodge owner's discriminatory conduct, its application
was enjoined. 124 Thus, since in self-help cases the creditor is authorized
by the statute to act in a certain manner, this should satisfy the more
stringent encouragement test proposed in Irvis.
In Gibbs, however, the Third Circuit found Reitman inapplicable 25
and determined that Irvis controlled the situation at bar. Reitman was
distinguished as "vastly dissimilar" since it involved a state constitutional
amendment authorizing private conduct theretofore prohibited, whereas
the self-help remedy in Gibbs had been authorized at common law long
before its codification. 126 So, too, since the creation and enforcement of,
as well as the motivation for, self-help repossession were private in nature,
there was no "significant" state involvement as required under Irvis.
2 7
It is submitted, however, that the court failed to perceive that self-help
statutes do have a telling effect upon the conduct of private parties. The
creditor, approached by the debtor whose property has been seized, can
say: "Look, the state lets me do this, the law says so, I have the right."
Thus, the debtor is faced with a situation in which state authority has
apparently validated the creditor's conduct; it is conceivable that the
124. See notes 113-15 and accompanying text supra.
125. The district court in Gibbs, by contrast, found both Reitman and Adickes v.
Kress & Co., Inc., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), persuasive. 369 F. Supp. at 48-49. Adickes
was cited by the court for the view expressed by Justice Brennan in a concurring
opinion: "When private action conforms with state policy, it becomes a manifestation
of that policy and is thereby drawn within the ambit of state action." 369 F. Supp.
at 49, quoting 398 U.S. at 203 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Defendants in Gibbs sought to distinguish Reitman and Adickes as racial
discrimination cases. The district court rejected this distinction, stating:
Since Congress has chosen not to distinguish between constitutionally pro-
tected rights in § 1983, this Court can only assume that the amount of state
involvement necessary to constitute "color of state law" for a deprivation of
one constitutional right would equal the amount of state involvement necessary
for another constitutional right.
369 F. Supp. at 49.
But the suggestion that the standard against which state action is measured
is different in equal protection claims than it is in due process claims has arisen in
several federal court cases. See, e.g., Jackson v. The Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623
(2d Cir. 1974) ; Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 445 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971) ;
Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 382 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1969). See also Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1968). At
least one commentator has also suggested that there exists such a double state action
standard; but he has also pointed out that as yet, the Supreme Court has not addressed
itself to this possibility. See Comment, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA.
L. REv. 840, 860-61 (1974).
126. 502 F.2d at 1111.
127. Id. at 1110-11. The court cited Irvis for the proposition that where the
impetus for the act is private, the state must be significantly involved. But, two ques-
tions arise. First, the court assumed the impetus for the act was private, the assump-
tion being made on the basis of certain contractual provisions in the standard sales
contracts. See 502 F.2d at 1110. See also id. at 1109 n.5. It appears that the ques-
tion of impetus would be a question of fact, since the statutes did probably exist prior
to the formulation of the standard sales contracts. Thus, this case is distinguishable
from Irvis. Second, it also appears that the Reitman Court mandate for a court to
"assess the potential impact of official action in determining whether the state has
significantly involved itself . . , ." in the private conduct was ignored. 387 U.S. at 380.
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debtor, observing the seemingly insurmountable obstacle imposed against
recovery of his property, will fail to take any action in response. In
Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia, some process was begun
whereby the debtor at some future time would be able to present the facts
as he or she saw them. In self-help situations, however, state law supports
apparently "absolute" repossession. Purely private conduct, then, is not
that at all. Rather, to the debtor, it appears that the creditor and the state
are acting as one. Thus, even if, as the Third Circuit had argued, the
creditor's conduct was permitted at common law, even if such conduct was
intended to be tempered by the enactment of the self-help statute, and
even if its impetus may be characterized as private, significant state in-
volvement in the form of encouragement nevertheless emanates from the
self-help repossession statutes.
In light of Shelley, Reitman, and Irvis, it is arguable that the Gibbs
court erred in facilely distinguishing the Sniadach series of cases on the
ground that no direct government action was involved. As suggested
previously, Sniadach and its successors would appear to contain a double
element of state action.128 Since the Supreme Court minimized the im-
portance of the more obvious incidents of state involvement, such as the
role of the clerk, the inference can be drawn that the statute itself provided
a sufficient nexus with the state. While this implicit statute qua state
action argument is admittedly not as obvious as the existence of judicial
process or the action of the clerk in assisting the creditor, Shelley, Reitman,
and Irvis explicitly provide support for this proposition. All three cases
demonstrated that state action can be present even where state officials
or judicial process are not involved. Shelley emphasized the role of state
law itself as state action,'129 while Reitman and Irvis described the encour-
agement generated by state legislation upon the conduct of private parties.1 0
Thus, in Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell, state action could have been
based not merely upon the state's assistance in the repossession procedure,
but rather primarily upon the existence of the statute itself and the
encouragement it provided to conduct which might otherwise have re-
mained dormant.
V. CONCLUSION
In Sniadach, Fuentes and their successors, the Supreme Court initiated
an expansive attack on the constitutionality of creditors' remedies, and
courts on the whole were responsive to the due process requirements that
these cases established. 3 1 Numerous recent lower court decisions, how-
ever, have indirectly negated the effect of the High Court cases by failing
to find state action even though state legislation did in fact exist.'3 2 As
128. See text accompanying notes 16 to 47 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
130. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
131. See Burke & Reber, supra note 1, at 1-9.
132. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
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a consequence, these self-help repossession statutes became invulnerable
to challenges based on the fourteenth amendment.
Generally, the process of decision in the self-help cases has been
to distinguish Sniadach and its progeny on the ground that they involved
either judicial process or action by a state official. Yet it has been demon-
strated that these more obvious manifestations of state involvement are
not essential to a finding of state action. Thus, the lower courts should be
subject to severe criticism for allowing the states to ignore the standards
set by the Supreme Court by merely establishing a procedure devoid of any
direct official action by a state officer and declaring the subsequent legis-
lation to be simply a codification of the common law of self-help.
183
This result appears contrary to the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in Shelley that the common law is state law and therefore may be state
action; to the decisions in Reitman and Irvis under which self-help statutes,
qua statutes, can be said to encourage and authorize a creditor's course
of conduct; and to the implications in Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and
North Gedrgia Finishing that official involvement may indeed be of less
significance than the bare existence of the authorizing statute itself. The
inference to be drawn, then, is that any court considering the state action
question in self-help repossession cases should interpret Sniadach and its
successors in light of Supreme Court decisions such as Shelley, Reitman,
and Irvis.
The result of decisions such as Gibbs has been to deny debtors the
opportunity to argue their due process claims. Regardless of how the
constitutional issue is ultimately resolved on the merits, it is submitted
that the debtor should not be denied access to the courts on the basis of the
questionable holding that no state action exists. It could indeed be argued
that the application of this holding is itself a denial of the debtor's due
process rights.
Robert G. Edinger
133. See note 70 supra.
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